The Collaborative Nature of Testimonial Learning.

Children's testimonial learning often occurs in epistemic collaborations with others. In this paper, we will discuss ways in which cultural learning emerges in social and interpersonal contexts, and is intrinsically supported and guided by children's collaborative capacities. Much work in cultural learning has focused on children's examination of speaker and model characteristics, but more recent research has investigated the interactive aspects of testimonial exchanges. We will review evidence that children (1) participate in the interpersonal commitments that are shared in testimonial transactions by way of direct address and epistemic buck passing, (2) participate in social groups that affect their selective learning in nuanced ways, and (3) may detect epistemic harms by listeners who refuse to believe sincere and accurate speakers. Implications for conceptualizing children's testimonial learning as an interactive mechanism of collaboration will be discussed.

Understanding the value of telescopic testimony: With age, a predominantly White Midwestern sample of children credits knowledge to speakers whose statements go beyond the evidence.

One primary value of testimony lies in its ability to extend our powers of observation. Do children credit more knowledge to speakers whose testimony goes beyond firsthand observation? The current study investigated 3- to 8-year-old children's (N = 180) and adults' (N = 20) knowledge attributions to speakers who made claims regarding perceptually evident features of a novel animal (e.g., "is brown") or claims regarding perceptually absent features (e.g., "eats insects"). By 7 years of age, children and adults attributed more knowledge to speakers who discussed telescopic information and generalized their knowledge to other domains. Because the knowledge base of child listeners expands with age, they place increased value on telescopic information and the speakers who provide it.

Evaluations of epistemic and practical reasons for belief in a predominantly White U.S. sample of preschoolers.

Parents and educators commonly seek to influence children's behavior by providing them with practical incentives, but how should we understand the influence of such incentives on children's beliefs? Are children capable of distinguishing between speech acts that provide practical reasons for believing, such as requests and offers, from speech acts that provide straightforward epistemic reasons, such as simple acts of telling? To investigate these questions, we randomly assigned 3- to 6-year-old children (N = 97) to one of two conditions (Request or Offer) in which two speakers each commented on a series of four exotic animals. In each condition, an agent who stated what an object was called with a simple telling ("This is a tanzer") was contrasted with an agent who made either a doxastic request ("I want you to think that this is a tanzer") or a doxastic offer ("If you think that this is a tanzer, I'll let you play with this new toy"). We then measured children's endorsement of and semantic memory for the claims as well as their knowledge attributions and resource allocation decisions. Our results suggest that children appreciate the epistemic reasons inherent in acts of telling when contrasted with doxastic requests, as evidenced by their general preference to learn from, attribute knowledge to, and share with the teller in the Request condition. When tellings were contrasted with doxastic offers, children were less systematic in their preferences. We discuss various interpretations of this finding and offer suggestions for future research.

Greasing (small) palms: Early rejection of bribery.

We tested when U.S. children reject bribery, and whether their rejections vary by public versus private setting. Six- to 10-year-olds (224 children, 118 boys, 106 girls, majority-White) participated across four experiments, in which participants indicated whether a contest judge should accept a contestant's financial gift. Children conveyed their preferences while in public or in private (in the presence or absence of an adult experimenter). Children's rejections of bribes were found to increase with age. Notably, younger children's acceptance rate was higher when the experimenter was present than in their absence; in contrast, older children showed comparable rejection rates across settings. Limitations in children's early reasoning about bribery, including the reputational and moral implications of accepting bribes in public, are discussed.

Early presence of a "power = males" association: Girls link power to their gender less often than boys but can be as motivated to gain it.

In three studies, it was tested whether children (N = 184; aged 6-10 years, White, mid- to high income) from a U.S. midwestern city used other individuals' gender and race to predict who is in charge and the means by which power is gained (Study 1) and whether children's own gender predicted their assignments of positions of authority (Study 2A) and pursuits of positions of authority (Study 2B). When asked to predict who was in charge at different workplaces, with age White children decreased their race-based, power-related favoritism; children were increasingly likely with age to link White adults to rather questionable routes to power as well as Black adults with meritorious reasons for gaining power (Study 1). In addition, boys (but not girls) systematically associated power with adult workers of their own gender and did so regardless of whether or not power had been obtained meritoriously (Study 1). Nonetheless, when given the option to assign an authority role (Study 2A) or assume an authority role (Study 2B), boys and girls exhibited comparable levels of in-group and self-biases.

Children's attributions of moral and epistemic virtue: Effects on learning and memory.

One developmental task faced by children is to identify, remember, and learn from epistemic and moral agents around them who are known to be good or virtuous. Here, in 2 studies, we examined U.S children's (N = 138; 55% female, 45% male; predominantly White, middle-class) memory processes for agents varying in moral and epistemic virtue. In Study 1, when presented with 16 faces of individuals who were said to vary in moral or epistemic virtue, children demonstrated enhanced trait memory for the characteristics of agents lacking in virtue relative to their more moral and competent counterparts. In Study 2, when presented with pairs of faces in the moral and epistemic domains, children showed enhanced content memory for information communicated by an epistemically competent individual with age. Together, these findings provide evidence that when categorizing single agents among many, children show better memory for their negative characteristics; and in a learning context, children show better retention of information communicated by more competent agents. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The roles of group membership and social exclusion in children's testimonial learning.

Here, we used high- and low-stakes testimonial learning tasks to better understand two important types of social influence on children's learning decisions: group membership and social ostracism. Children (4- and 5-year-olds; N = 100) were either included or excluded by in-group or outgroup members in an online ball tossing game. Then, children were asked to selectively learn new information from either an in-group or out-group member. They also received counterintuitive information from an in-group or out-group member that was in conflict with their own intuitions. When learning new information, children who were excluded were more likely to selectively trust information from their in-group member. In contrast, when accepting counterintuitive information, children relied only on group membership regardless of their exclusion status. Together, these findings demonstrate ways in which different forms of testimonial learning are guided not only by epistemic motivations but also by social motivations of affiliation and maintaining relationships with others.

The development of a morality against power abuse: The case of bribery.

In three experiments, we presented children and adults with opportunities to condemn acts resembling bribery, a prevalent form of power abuse. Adults and children (N = 333) in the United States rated the acceptability of actions by contest judges. Judges used their position in a self-serving (e.g., accepted or requested gifts from contestants prior to picking winners) versus responsible (e.g., rejected gifts, accepted gifts after judging) way. Across experiments, children by age 10 gave harsher ratings to judges who accepted or requested gifts prior to selecting the contest winners. Further, children expected judges to become biased (Experiment 1) and secretive (Experiment 2) if they accepted gifts during the contest. Children's judgments were influenced by characters' authority level (Experiment 3) and varied as a function of age and modality of assessment (e.g., whether gifts were accepted vs. rejected). Taken together, these results constitute evidence that by late childhood people showcase an emerging moral stance against unethical actions linked to authority-based corruption. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Learning From "Thinkers": Parent Epistemological Understanding Predicts Individual Differences in Children's Judgments About Reasoners.

Four-, 5-, and 6-year olds (N = 102) observed agents perform a reasoning task that required gathering hidden evidence. An agent who made sound inferences was contrasted with an agent who made either unsound inferences (UI; failed to base conclusion on gathered evidence) or guesses (failed to gather evidence). Four-year olds attributed knowledge to all agents and endorsed their conclusions widely. However, 5- and 6-year olds' knowledge attributions were mitigated by UI, and 6-year olds neither attributed knowledge to a guesser nor endorsed his conclusions. Notably, parents' tendency to make evaluativist epistemological judgments-which place value in evidence as a basis for belief-predicted children's reluctance to learn from and credit knowledge to poor reasoners. Parents' evaluativist judgments also predicted children's selective learning about object functions.

The sense of obligation in children's testimonial learning.

We extend Tomasello's discussion of children's developing sense of obligation to testimonial learning. First, we review a battery of behaviors in testimonial exchanges that parallel those described by Tomasello. Second, we explore the variable ways in which children hold others accountable, suggestive that children's evaluations of moral and epistemic responsibilities in joint collaborative activities are distinct.

The role of testimony in children's moral decision making: Evidence from China and United States.

What does it take know a moral truth or principle? Although testimony is an undisputed source of empirical knowledge of contingent facts, it is less clear whether it is possible to acquire "second-hand moral knowledge" (Jones, 1999; Wolff, 1998). In the present studies, 3- to 5-year-old Chinese (N = 124) and U.S. American (N = 90) children were asked to judge whether novel, distress-inducing actions were morally permissible, both independently and after either 1 or 3 adult informants had made counterintuitive judgments. Although participants made appropriate moral judgments independently, children from both countries were affected by the counterintuitive testimony provided by the adult informant(s). Moreover, Chinese children were especially receptive to such counterintuitive claims. These findings demonstrate that intuitive moral judgments based on perceived harm are common across 2 cultural groups, but adult testimony can potentially shift those judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Children's Judgments of Epistemic and Moral Agents: From Situations to Intentions.

Children's evaluations of moral and epistemic agents crucially depend on their discerning that an agent's actions were performed intentionally. Here we argue that children's epistemic and moral judgments reveal practices of forgiveness and blame, trust and mistrust, and objection or disapproval and that such practices are supported by children's monitoring of the situational constraints on agents. Inherent in such practices is the understanding that agents are responsible for actions performed under certain conditions but not others. We discuss a range of situational constraints on children's early epistemic and moral evaluations and clarify how these situational constraints serve to support children's identification of intentional actions. By monitoring the situation, children distinguish intentional from less intentional action and selectively hold epistemic and moral agents accountable. We argue that these findings inform psychological and philosophical theorizing about attributions of moral and epistemic agency and responsibility.

Varieties of trust in preschoolers' learning and practical decisions.

Keeping commitments to others can be difficult, and we know that people sometimes fail to keep them. How does a speaker's ability to keep commitments affect children's practical decisions to trust and their epistemic decisions to learn? An amassing body of research documents children's trust in testimonial learning decisions, which can be moved in the face of epistemic and moral evidence about an agent. However, other bases for trust go largely unexplored in this literature, such as interpersonal reasons to trust. Here, we investigated how direct bids for interpersonal trust in the form of making commitments, or obligations to the listener, influence a range of decisions toward that agent. We found that 3- and 4-year-olds' (N = 75) practical decisions to wait and to share were moved as a function of a person's commitment-keeping ability, but epistemic decisions to learn were not. Keeping one's commitments may provide children with interpersonal reasons to trust, reasons that may function in ways distinct from the considerations that bear on accepting a claim.

Cognitive Foundations of Learning from Testimony.

Humans acquire much of their knowledge from the testimony of other people. An understanding of the way that information can be conveyed via gesture and vocalization is present in infancy. Thus, infants seek information from well-informed interlocutors, supply information to the ignorant, and make sense of communicative acts that they observe from a third-party perspective. This basic understanding is refined in the course of development. As they age, children's reasoning about testimony increasingly reflects an ability not just to detect imperfect or inaccurate claims but also to assess what inferences may or may not be drawn about informants given their particular situation. Children also attend to the broader characteristics of particular informants-their group membership, personality characteristics, and agreement or disagreement with other potential informants. When presented with unexpected or counterintuitive testimony, children are prone to set aside their own prior convictions, but they may sometimes defer to informants for inherently social reasons.

Trusting others: shared reality in testimonial learning.

Much of early learning depends on others, and the transmission of testimony presents children with a range of opportunities to learn about and from other people. Much work has focused on children's ability to select or prefer particular sources of information based on various epistemic (e.g. accuracy, reliability, perceptual access, expertise) and moral (e.g. benevolence, group membership, honesty) characteristics. Understanding the mechanisms by which such selective preferences emerge has been couched primarily in frameworks that treat testimony as a source of inductive evidence, and that treat children's trust as an evidence-based inference. However, there are other distinct interpersonal considerations that support children's trust towards others, considerations that influence who children learn from as well as other practical decisions. Broadening our conception of trust and considering the interpersonal reasons we have to trust others can both strengthen our current understanding of the role that trust plays in children's learning and practical decisions as well as provide a more holistic picture of how children participate in a shared reality with their family, peers, and communities.

What I don't know won't hurt you: The relation between professed ignorance and later knowledge claims.

Testimony is a valuable source of information for young learners, in particular if children maintain vigilance against errors while still being open to learning from imperfectly knowledgeable sources. We find support for this idea by examining how children evaluate individual speakers who present very different epistemic risks by being previously ignorant or inaccurate. Results across 2 experiments show that children attribute knowledge to (Experiment 1) and endorse new claims made by speakers (Experiment 2) who previously professed ignorance about familiar object labels, but not to speakers whose labels were previously inaccurate. Study 2 further clarifies that children are not simply relying on links between informational access and knowledge; children rejected testimony from a previously inaccurate speaker even when she had perceptual access to support her claim. These results show that children actively monitor the reliability of a speaker's knowledge claims, distinguish unreliable speakers from those who sometimes admit ignorance, raising new questions about how such admissions factor in to children's appraisal of the scope and limits of a person's knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record

Conceptual constraints and mechanisms in children's selective learning.

Although we can support Heyes' call for more research on mechanisms, we disagree that the problem has been ignored as Heyes suggests. We also doubt that basic learning mechanisms are alone sufficient to account for the broad range of findings in the selective social learning literature. Although phylogenetically shared learning mechanisms must support selective social learning, we believe that they must also be guided by top-down conceptual considerations that may be special to humans. Research to date has been focused on establishing the boundary conditions on selective social learning, with the goal of making generalizations that will constrain theorizing about the character of that special knowledge. This is critical to our understanding of both why and how selective social learning manifests in children.

Young Children Detect and Avoid Logically Inconsistent Sources: The Importance of Communicative Context and Executive Function.

The reported research tested the hypothesis that young children detect logical inconsistency in communicative contexts that support the evaluation of speakers' epistemic reliability. In two experiments (N = 194), 3- to 5-year-olds were presented with two speakers who expressed logically consistent or inconsistent claims. Three-year-olds failed to detect inconsistencies (Experiment 1), 4-year-olds detected inconsistencies when expressed by human speakers but not when read from books, and 5-year-olds detected inconsistencies in both contexts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, children demonstrated skepticism toward testimony from previously inconsistent sources. Executive function and working memory each predicted inconsistency detection. These findings indicate logical inconsistency understanding emerges in early childhood, is supported by social and domain general cognitive skills, and plays a role in adaptive learning from testimony.

Reasoning about knowledge: Children's evaluations of generality and verifiability.

In a series of experiments, we examined 3- to 8-year-old children's (N=223) and adults' (N=32) use of two properties of testimony to estimate a speaker's knowledge: generality and verifiability. Participants were presented with a "Generic speaker" who made a series of 4 general claims about "pangolins" (a novel animal kind), and a "Specific speaker" who made a series of 4 specific claims about "this pangolin" as an individual. To investigate the role of verifiability, we systematically varied whether the claim referred to a perceptually-obvious feature visible in a picture (e.g., "has a pointy nose") or a non-evident feature that was not visible (e.g., "sleeps in a hollow tree"). Three main findings emerged: (1) young children showed a pronounced reliance on verifiability that decreased with age. Three-year-old children were especially prone to credit knowledge to speakers who made verifiable claims, whereas 7- to 8-year-olds and adults credited knowledge to generic speakers regardless of whether the claims were verifiable; (2) children's attributions of knowledge to generic speakers was not detectable until age 5, and only when those claims were also verifiable; (3) children often generalized speakers' knowledge outside of the pangolin domain, indicating a belief that a person's knowledge about pangolins likely extends to new facts. Findings indicate that young children may be inclined to doubt speakers who make claims they cannot verify themselves, as well as a developmentally increasing appreciation for speakers who make general claims.

Varieties of testimony: children's selective learning in semantic versus episodic domains.

Although preschoolers appear sensitive to the risk of misinformation and demonstrate selective learning in certain experimental contexts (e.g., Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004), other paradigms emphasize their striking credulity (e.g., Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010). The current study sought to explain these divergent patterns by examining the possibility that errors for semantic information, a type of information that is typically generalizable and difficult to verify independently, promote greater vigilance than errors for episodic information, which is often event-specific and independently verifiable. Three- and 4-year-olds first viewed 2 speakers testify correctly or incorrectly about object labels (Semantic condition) or locations (Episodic condition). At test, speakers presented conflicting novel object labels and locations. Preschoolers initially exposed to semantic inaccuracy more vigilantly preferred a previously accurate informant than did children initially exposed to episodic inaccuracy. Findings speak against a homogeneous treatment of testimony and suggest that preschoolers' testimonial vigilance varies according to the content of speakers' errors.